The United Nations' agencies and many scholars have regarded traditional knowledge as an alternative to science for the purposes of managing the environment. Many countries have adopted this line of approach and formulated some policy strategies. A number of scholars also have engaged in traditional knowledge research and published their works. Despite a large number of publications on traditional knowledge, there seems to be little consensus about the definition of what traditional knowledge is and how it can be useful for environmental management. This article first approaches this definition problem within a historical context in order to clarify the core issues surrounding the definition of traditional knowledge. It then discusses how traditional knowledge can be validated among parties with different interests so that traditional knowledge research and policy can be more effectively implemented in policy-making arenas.
practices. They would also equitably share the benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992) .
This decade also turned out to be particularly fruitful in producing case studies on traditional knowledge in academic journals and popular publications (Agrawal, 1995; Ellen, Parkes & Bicker, 2000; Posey, 1999; Sillitoe, 2000) . However, some scholars have become increasingly suspicious about the usefulness of traditional knowledge in dealing with environmental problems (Bohensky & Maru, 2011; Usher, 2000) . After decades of discussion and debate over the usefulness of traditional knowledge, scholars could not reach consensus on its definition. Furthermore, few works have given careful consideration to the ways scholars, and Indigenous peoples and local communities have validated traditional knowledge. As I will discuss, many scholars and Indigenous representatives have contributed to this discussion to some extent, but the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which has devoted much of its activities to dealing with these problems, still acknowledges in its homepage that "there is not yet an accepted definition of TK [traditional knowledge] at the international level" (WIPO, 2015, para. 2) .
The purpose of this article, therefore, is to examine some core problems of defining and validating traditional knowledge. This task is important for both scholars, and Indigenous peoples and local communities to begin negotiations for collaborations and partnerships. It is also relevant to environmental policies and Indigenous policies in general as the vague understanding of these definition and validation problems has led policymakers and scholars to heavily rely on the personal assumption of what the definition of traditional knowledge is supposed to be and how traditional knowledge should be validated. WIPO and other organizations do provide their working definition of traditional knowledge, but, after examining a large number of scholarly articles on traditional knowledge, I still find it important that we examine these definition and validation problems in this special issue, "The Future of Traditional Knowledge." As this issue strives to establish partnerships between Indigenous peoples and local knowledge holders, and scholars and policymakers, it is essential that all stakeholders can recognize some pitfalls they may fall into in attempting to obtain mutual understanding about the validity of traditional knowledge. land, harvesting, and cultural practices at large. We need to grasp traditional knowledge within an interdisciplinary and interconnected context to better understand the problems of defining and validating traditional knowledge. In this sense, I largely agree with the working definition of traditional knowledge by WIPO that encompasses not only ecological knowledge but also other types of traditional cultural expressions. Currently, it defines traditional knowledge as "knowledge, know-how, skills and practices that are developed, sustained and passed on from generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its cultural or spiritual identity" (WIPO, 2015, para. 1).
In the process of tracing the history of defining and validating traditional knowledge among scholars and others, this article attempts to examine two open-ended questions: First, what is the definition of traditional knowledge? Second, how can one validate traditional knowledge? Examining these questions is important to clarify the ethical and legal implications of collecting, using, publishing, or commercializing traditional knowledge. This point is important partly because, as I argue, debates over the usefulness of traditional knowledge have been largely affected by the lack of in-depth understanding about what constitutes "tradition" and "knowledge." In policy implementations, these questions also have affected traditional knowledge holders who want to maintain control over their own knowledge and protect it from exploitation or misappropriation by researchers and business speculators. Finally, my investigation of these questions leads to the recognition of one neglected but salient aspect in previous traditional knowledge discussions: A clearer definition of traditional knowledge can help us better understand the scope of Indigenous rights and governance.
Problems of Definition
The most contested aspect of the definition of traditional knowledge is related to how scholars and others have perceived "tradition." Many Australian anthropologists who are experts on Aboriginal cultures have persistently argued that the term traditional knowledge is archaic or obsolete (Anderson, 2009 ). It is not, they claim, relevant to the contemporary knowledge Aboriginal people hold. Partly because of this concern, they have proposed to abandon the term "traditional knowledge" and instead use "Indigenous knowledge." For example, Jane Anderson (2009) , a legal scholar on Aboriginal intellectual property rights, contends, The insistence on the "traditional" as the key marker of difference obscures contemporary indigenous practice and the reality that indigenous knowledge also undergoes transformation overtime in usage and circulation both within family or community contexts and/or between families, the community and external parties. (p. 11) For Anderson, the term "traditional" evokes a romanticized notion whereas the term "Indigenous" does not.
Australian scholars are not only the ones to claim that term "tradition" is archaic or obsolete and reifies Indigenous knowledge production. For a long time, this understanding has been shared by those-in the fields of literature, politics, philosophy, and other genres-who have argued that scientific knowledge and modernity are antithetical to traditions. Two major ideas have evolved here (although these two are not entirely separable).
1 Similar to the proposals of Alexander Hamilton, Adam Ferguson, Max Weber, and John Miller, the first idea celebrated the advancement of industry, scientific knowledge, modernity, and economic efficiency (Shils, 1981 (Davidson, 1992) . The other group, represented by J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur, Thomas Jefferson, and Francis Parkman, yearned for yeoman ideals and deplored the negative ramifications of mechanization and urbanization, such as poverty, crimes, and other social problems (Matsui, 2009) . They romanticized traditional societies like those of Native Americans as simple, innocent, but ecologically ideal. Both approaches were essentially based on the assumption that "traditional" is antithetical to modernity (Bendix, 1967) .
From the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth, cultural and social anthropologists popularized the notion of traditional culture and society as something old, pre-modern, primitive, and static. In general, anthropologists at this time did not use the term "traditional" in describing "primitive" people, but their studies of them have strongly influenced the discussion of contemporary scholars. Edward B. Tylor's Primitive Culture (1871) laid the foundation for later anthropologists to conduct research among "primitive" cultures as a way to understand the early stage of human society. Tyler (1871) proposed that
The savage state in some measure represents an early condition of mankind, out of which the higher culture has gradually been developed or evolved, by processes still in regular operation as of old, the result showing that, on the whole, progress has far prevailed over relapse. (p. 28) 1 It is important to acknowledge that some critics were ambivalent about both the destruction of tradition and the dominance of modernity. Walter Benjamin's writings show this ambivalence (McCole, 1993) .
He then explains how mythology, language, and other cultural elements may help anthropologists better understand the "primitive" stages of culture. In doing so, Tylor did not pay much attention to historical changes or continuities in "primitive" cultural elements.
In the early twentieth century, the methods of field work and direct observation became standard practice and gave scientific characteristics to anthropological works. 2 In doing so, anthropologists adopted Tylor's approach and continued to treat cultural and traditional elements as something frozen in time. For example, Bronislaw Malinowski, Raymond Firth, and A. F. Radcliffe-Brown ventured into the remote islands of the Oceania. Radcliffe-Brown also published influential works on Australian Aboriginal society, which later laid the foundation for social anthropologists in Australia.
They chose these areas because they had perceived them to be typically "primitive" and least influenced by civilizations. 3 What Malinowski postulated on culture as a result of years of fieldwork did not leave much room to consider historical changes in society. Radcliffe-Brown dichotomized science and history and regarded the latter as unverifiable speculation or illusion of explanation (Kroeber, 1952) . Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown theoretically opposed each other in advocating their theories of "primitive" society, but both presented their studies with little consideration of historical change (Radcliffe-Brown, 1949) .
A group of prominent American cultural anthropologists such as Franz Boas, Alfred Kroeber, Ruth
Benedict, and Julian Steward examined various cultural groups in North America to identify patterns of culture or cultural ecology (Moore, 2009) . In theorizing ethnographical data, Boas (Boas, 1911 (Boas, /1938 and Benedict (Benedict, 1934 (Benedict, /1961 attempted to characterize cultural patterns and
behaviors to understand what they called "culture-wholes." On this point of picturing the entire culture, Kroeber began to distance himself from Boas and Benedict by emphasizing the importance of considering historical contexts. In his Nature of Culture, Kroeber (1952) advocated to extend
Benedict's static theory of a whole culture by adding historical depth. In doing so, he emphasized stylistic features and identified historic "configurations" of a culture (see also Steward, 1962) . Boas later acknowledged the growing trend of historicizing anthropology, but he still sided with Benedict, who primarily examined the socio-psychological aspects of culture (Benedict, 1934 (Benedict, /1961 ).
Nevertheless, it was largely a historical model for studying "primitive" culture and society that shaped the ways anthropologists understood "traditional" society and knowledge in the late twentieth century (Peterson, 2010) .
There is another notable aspect of anthropological and ethnographical works from the early twentieth century. In collecting and recording knowledge in Indigenous societies, many studies omitted, for example, commercial trading activities and the ownership of land and intellectual properties. Part of the reason was that most anthropologists believed that "primitive" peoples, who
were supposedly living in communal, egalitarian, and simple societies, did not have the idea of commerce, division of labor, or law. Although Malinowski (1926) did recognize the existence of "primitive" law among the Trobriand Islanders in Crime and Custom in Savage Society, he nevertheless portrayed the islanders as lacking the authority to enforce it. Their understanding of individual rights was similarly unstructured. The principle of communal reciprocity dominated much of their activities and behaviors (Conley & O'Barr, 2002) . This recognition of law in "primitive" society was met with criticism by anthropologists like Radcliffe-Brown (1949) and William Seagle. Seagle (1937) argued that Malinowski's use of the term "law" stretched its definition.
For him, the law existed in a society with political and legal organizations that enforce written codes.
He argued that the islanders in Malinowski's descriptions had customs but not law.
After the 1950s, however, a group of anthropologists, sociologists, and theologians began expressing Some of the binding elements between the pre-modern and the modern also included kinship ties, religious beliefs, linguistic affiliations, and territorial communalism. Bendix (1967) also reminded the reader that "modern" elements existed long before the so-called modern era.
Clifford Davidson (1992) , a literary critic who studied theatrical traditions in Western societies, similarly emphasized the continuity from pre-modern to modern periods. For example, he explained that some typical modern technological advances derive their foundation from the accumulation of knowledge, innovations, and practices from the pre-modern period. For example, the technology of building automobiles became possible only after the pre-modern inventions of not just the wheel, but also the moveable front axle and the four-wheeled wagon. In a similar vein, the computer is the result of thousands of years of development in mathematics as well as the technology of using electricity.
Another prominent sociologist Edward Shils (1981) "confirms his confidence in the reliability of the scientific community and it thereby sustains his morale as a scientist and his confidence in the integrity of the scientific enterprise" (Shils, 1981, p. 113 ). This point resonates what Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) earlier pointed out about the progress of science as a product of the accumulated knowledge development. Shils (1981) also argued that traditions are not frozen in time; instead, they evolve by adapting to changes. He said, "The rules which survive as tradition are those which have made the most successful adaptations to changes in the environment; they have shown their efficacy" (p. 205).
These changes come from both endogenous and exogenous sources. Traditions exist within a person, community, or nation. Traditions, through changes, have to be "routinized" by people, and this process normally takes "three generations" to be accomplished. Shils did not clarify why he set out this minimum requirement to validate traditionality of a tradition, but he did acknowledge that the length of one generation is difficult to determine.
In a study of Madras in India, anthropologist Milton Singer (1971) reiterated some of Shils' points by examining how traditional Madras society responded to modernity. Like Shils, he did not believe that tradition and modernity are antithetical; rather, for Singer, modernity existed within traditions.
He contended that modernity was "a permanent layer or dimension of indigenous culture and not simply a collection of recent foreign imports or the fashionable life-style of a privileged class" (Singer, 1971, p. 175 ). Singer showed how Madras society incorporated "modern" elements into its traditional "cultural protoplasm." When the new and the foreign are introduced, Madras society first
compartmentalized it in what he called a "cultural enclave." Then the compartmentalized new or foreign was selectively integrated into Indigenous traditions, slowly diluting the alien aspects of the new or the foreign (Singer, 1971) . In order for the new to become fully validated as traditional, according to Singer, it had to become "old," conform to customary or scriptural norms, and have an origin myth, in which it is linked to a great traditional set of ancestors or precedents. In Madras society, tradition also was connected to morality, enabling some to claim ancient affiliation and help validate one's present status in society (Singer, 1971) . Shils (1981) also similarly argued that traditions provide guiding principles to good governance of a society.
In the 1980s, post-modern interpretations entered the discussion. A new generation of scholars agreed that tradition is not something frozen in the past: it is not archaic or obsolete. Rather, tradition commands one's consciousness in the present. Anthropologist Jocelyn Linnekin (1983) argued that: "the selection of what constitutes tradition is always made in the present. Tradition is somewhat associated with the past, but this 'past' is equivocal: it does not correspond to the experience of any particular generation" (p. 241). Terrence Tilley (2006) According to Indigenous authors, Indigenous peoples transmit their traditions through traditional ways of knowing, most typically through narratives. Narratives are enhanced through seeing some landscapes and places and carved and painted objects (Basso, 1996) . Fixico (2003) Various traditional social events in the northwest coastal regions of North America often offer venues to the transmission of knowledge and wisdom. The narratives that are presented in these events sometimes clarify the territorial boundaries of the family or community (Mills, 1994) . These narratives and performances are usually witnessed and validated by both communal members and non-communal members (Bringhurst, 2011) .
Indigenous peoples' writings also serve to convey traditions to non-Native audiences. Fixico (2003) , King (2003) , Deloria (1973) , and other Native American writers commonly emphasize that traditional people and Western scientists or religious people acquire and transmit knowledge in fundamentally different ways. In his controversial book 4 on traditional knowledge, the American Indian Mind in a Linear World, Fixico (2003) frequently discusses his personal observation of the very different perspectives that he and non-Native people held. Recollecting his grade school days, for example, he says, "I often wondered why I thought in a different way than my classmates, and why I did things differently from a mental point of view" (Fixico, 2003, p. xi) . Throughout his book, he attempts to clarify the differences of Native worldviews from linear Western scientific views of the world.
In fact, many Native leaders have expressed similar sentiment as early as the early twentieth century (Matsui, 2009) . One of the reasons for emphasizing the differences was that traditional knowledge holders did not appreciate the linear ways of managing environmental matters. Anthropologist D.
Michael Warren (1989) found that in developing countries educated individuals began to challenge Western scientific control over environmental management in their nations. Although some non-Indigenous critics challenged the essentialized notion of Indigenous-European cultural dichotomy, especially concerning the portrayal of Indigenous peoples as ecologists (Krech, 1999) , Marshall Sahlins (1993) and others look at this phenomenon as part of natural cultural responses.
Sahlins sees the claim of "ecological" Natives as the emergence of the "proxy critics of Western society" rather than the creation or invention of myths. The process of essentializing traditionality is also akin to the self-conscious effort to establish a "differentiated cultural space" (pp. 19-20) . Legal scholar Karen Engle (2010) also observed a similar phenomenon in her book about the Indigenous movement in the Americas after the 1970s. She recognized that the Indigenous peoples were not naïve about claiming differences. She instead treated the phenomenon as "strategic essentialism,"
with which Native peoples attempted to advance their status in a political and legal arena. Some ideas that are derived from Indigenous observation or expression, they conclude, require scientific testing before they are accepted as knowledge. For them, knowledge represents rationality and empirically tested ways of knowing, and Indigenous peoples' ways of knowing do not conform to this category. Ultimately, they argue that there is no way traditional knowledge can be validated with scientific knowledge because these two knowledge systems are fundamentally different (Widdowson & Howard, 2008) . Berkes, Colding, and Folke (2000) similarly emphasize fundamental differences between traditional and scientific ways of knowing, but they still believe that some types, if not all, of traditional knowledge are compatible with scientific knowledge. However, they make a cautious statement that the traditional knowledge system does not always convey ecologically wise information to ecologists, and, therefore, "traditional ecological wisdom requires a reality check" (Berkes et al., 2000 (Berkes et al., , p. 1260 .
Peter Usher (2000), historical geographer and consultant in Canada, similarly recommends in his study on traditional knowledge policy in northern Canada that scientists validate certain types of traditional knowledge Indigenous peoples possess, especially concerning the knowledge related to the observation and uses of natural resources.
Other scholars express suspicion about the possibility of "validating" traditional knowledge by scientists. Philosophers and scientists have argued that validation, which denotes the recognition of legitimacy, cannot be logically established in scientific models, which may be found only temporarily plausible. They believe that the scientific processes of validation or verification leave out many uncertainties, and, no matter how plausible, once-validated findings can still be contested later by other scientific observations. Ultimately, scientific models cannot validate or verify what is real in the environment (Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette & Belitz, 1994) . So far, anthropologists, not natural scientists, have discussed the methods of validating cultural knowledge (Broom & Kitsuse, 1955; Handwerker, 2002) . If natural scientists were to validate traditional knowledge and wisdom, as giving the authority to government-hired scientists to legitimatize traditional knowledge could be regarded as another form of colonization (Butler, 2006) . Others added that validation from Western knowledge systems is not necessary as traditional knowledge itself holds its own intrinsic value in environmental governance. Christoph Antons (2009) , legal expert on traditional knowledge in Asia,
argued that traditional knowledge "should not be interpreted as limiting or seeking externally to define the diverse and holistic conceptions of knowledge within the traditional context" (p. 2).
One study on fish management in Australia, however, provides a window into Indigenous peoples' perspectives on this question. The researchers in this study asked Aboriginal people if the scientific validation of their Indigenous knowledge on fish was disrespectful to them. The result of their interview showed that Aboriginal people, both co-researchers and elders, were generally positive about the validation process because, once validated by scientists, their knowledge would become legitimized in mainstream society. The researchers also found that the validation process may improve the mutual understanding of each other's value systems that eventually may lead to the better collaborative relationships between Aboriginal communities and researchers. They believe that promoting mutual cross-cultural understanding through the validation process can lead to a change of social values in natural resource use activities, which embraces both Indigenous and scientific views (Gratani et al., 2011) .
Anthropologist Paul Nadasdy's (2006) study on the traditional ecological knowledge policy in Yukon, Canada, however, shows strained and frustrated relationships that developed after some years of "cooperation" between Indigenous knowledge holders and scientists in wild game management. The government policy was laid out under the premise of "trust" and "co-management," but biologists and Indigenous peoples developed their arguments by using their own sources of information without much exchange. Nadasdy (2006) Indigenous rights, but it has also strained cross-cultural relations (Ray, 2003; Ray, 2010; Thuen, trapping and hunting occupations by participating in a cash economy. This erosion of traditionality among Native witnesses made their testimonies less authentic. In addition, McEachern regarded the Native origin story and other historical evidence as fallacy. For example, he found the story that emphasized that their ancestral root in their traditional territory "not true" because it did not conform to the available archaeological studies (Ridington, 1992, pp. 18-19 ).
McEachern's judgment is one of the most extreme versions of skepticism that does not recognize the validity and authenticity of traditional knowledge that is expressed in the present context. Also,
McEachern's perception of Native testimonies and their traditional life challenged the authority of traditional chiefs and humiliated many Native witnesses, who took the risk of revealing in court the knowledge that was not supposed to be shared to outsiders and then paying the price. Elders did not expect that the court would validate the knowledge they presented, either. They meant to share the knowledge so that the court would have a better understanding of their ancestral connection to their traditional territory (Monet, 1991) . In McEachern's decision, even expert witness reports by renowned cultural anthropologists were almost entirely dismissed as he found the reports politically biased because those anthropologists conducted research and wrote their reports on behalf of Native peoples (Culhane, 1998; Ray, 2011; Ridington, 1992) . The report of one historian, who had not had contact with Native peoples and whose analysis was based solely on archival documents was admitted as evidence (Ray, 1991) . The outright dismissal of Native testimonies and anthropological evidence was later reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, which deemed Native testimonies as valid evidence (Delgamuukw v. B.C., 1997) .
More recently, the protection of traditional knowledge against bio-piracy has also posed legal and ethical questions (Balick, 2007; De Carvalho, 2007; Mackey & Liang, 2012; Oguamanam, 2006; Sarmiento, 2009; ) and cultural appropriation (Brown, 2003; Coombe, 1998; Tsosie, 2002; Young, 2010) . Pharmaceutical companies or agro-biological institutions have located specific traditional knowledge that is related to the medicinal quality or genetic diversity of plant species and varieties.
Once placed in a laboratory setting, the collected sample can be developed into a pharmaceutical product, a plant variety or genetically modified organisms with patent without paying the original knowledge providers any royalty (King, Carlson, & Moran, 1996) . In this process, scientists often validated the usefulness of the knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local communities in their own value systems. But neither this knowledge nor the people who produced it gained meaningful recognition (Curci, 2010; De Carvalho, 2007) .
Much of legal and ethical discussion so far to prevent these appropriation practices has focused on the protection of rights for Indigenous peoples and local communities to cultural and spiritual activities, land, and natural resources. This discussion, however, has not yet clarified how scholars and policymakers recognize the validity of traditional knowledge in implementing basic principles for collaborations and partnerships. Numerous ongoing cases of commercializing Indigenous and ethnic cultural objects and symbols in popular culture, businesses and activities such as movies, plays, literature, and tourism (Brown, 2003; Matsui, 2013) testify to the limit of current ethical principles and legal frameworks to fully acknowledge the knowledge of Indigenous peoples and local communities. The WIPO, various other United Nations' agencies (e.g., UNESCO, UNEP, UNDP, UNU-IAS), and legal experts have extensively discussed the extent to which Indigenous peoples and ethnic communities can be protected from these problems by revising international intellectual property law (Oguamanam, 2006) or revisiting the concept of cultural rights (Alderman, 2008; Carpenter, Katyal, & Riley, 2009; Carpenter, Katyal, & Riley, 2010 WIPO, 2008) . In discussing these legal implications of using traditional knowledge, many legal experts expressed the need to establish dispute resolution mechanisms in both legal and ethical areas. In fact, as I discussed elsewhere (Matsui, 2012) , in the latter half of the twentieth century, scholars and international organizations have established many non-legal or ethical principles to provide a better protection to traditional knowledge holders from biopiracy and cultural appropriation (Bannister, 2009) Studies on organizational knowledge sharing and validation processes have only recently emerged.
One study on knowledge sharing and management found that the criteria of validating knowledge in a narrative are normally implicitly applied through the action of knowledge transmission without any conscious reflections (Geiger & Schreyögg, 2012) . This implicit knowledge sharing, I argue, has affected the ways scholars have discussed the definition and validation of traditional knowledge. The implicit nature of knowledge validation poses some challenges for many scholars in their attempts to understand other culture's implicit knowledge validation processes. And the extent to which ethical principles and law can guide scholars and policymakers to better understand knowledge validation as cultural process can help shape more cross-culturally sensitive research ethics guidelines in the future.
Conclusion
Given the adversarial conditions of recent cross-cultural debates over the definition and validation of traditional knowledge, the question is: How can scholars, politicians, Indigenous peoples, local communities, and international organizations agree on how to define and validate traditional knowledge? In this article, I have clarified the problems that have risen from defining and validating traditional knowledge. The discussion above should help us better understand some problem areas in defining and validating traditional knowledge.
However, there are still other problem areas that cannot be clearly answered. We must still connect traditional knowledge issues to those of Indigenous peoples' governance and sovereignty. In implementing traditional knowledge policy for biodiversity conservation and environmental assessment, Canada, for example, has promoted the policy implementation mechanism of stewardship, in which local people can be active participants in planning, executing, and evaluating environmental management measures (Matsui, 2012) . Although Indigenous peoples are included in this process, their sui generis rights as Indigenous peoples and their sovereignty in their traditional territories have not gained much attention. This may sound strange if one understands the existence of the traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples within locally specific environmental settings.
While there is much discussion about the extent to which Indigenous peoples have rights to their land and resources, we do not yet have a clear idea about how the protection of traditional knowledge can be part of Indigenous rights. Ultimately, we must grapple with the question of whether Indigenous peoples should have governing rights to biodiversity and natural resources in general.
In connection to the issue of Indigenous rights and sovereignty, the questions of definition and validation also require the establishment of better cross-cultural processes for reconciliation in building trust for collaborations and partnerships in scientific, artistic, and business endeavours. For this, more political scientists, legal scholars, historians, and anthropologists, among others, can
